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The Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction 
Over Disputes Between the United States and 
a State 
LOCHLAN F. SHELFER† 
ABSTRACT 
Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to hear controversies 
between a state and the United States? Although the Supreme 
Court has asserted this power, commentators have puzzled over the 
question for decades. Because Article III does not enumerate 
controversies between a state and the United States, many scholars 
have concluded that the Court’s exercise of this power is 
illegitimate, or at least atextual. This Article argues that the 
Constitution’s text does give the Supreme Court the power to hear 
such controversies, but to understand why it is necessary to 
understand the way that the framers would, for the sake of brevity, 
combine several concepts into a single phrase, what this Article 
terms “collapse textualism.” The framers combined two heads of 
jurisdiction (“controversies between the United States and a State” 
and “all other controversies involving the United States”) into a 
single grant of jurisdiction over “Controversies to which the United 
States shall be a Party.” Thus, because the Court has original 
jurisdiction over those controversies “in which a State shall be a 
Party” it therefore has original jurisdiction over “controversies 
between the United States and a State.” 
INTRODUCTION 
Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction over 
controversies between a state and the United States? 
 
† Associate Fellow, Stanford Law School Constitutional Law Center and 
Associate Attorney, Appellate and Constitutional Law Practice Group, Gibson, 
Dunn & Crutcher. 
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Doctrinally, this question has been answered in the 
affirmative. Ever since the Supreme Court first considered 
the puzzle in Justice Harlan’s 1892 opinion, United States v. 
Texas,1 which affirmed jurisdiction, the Court has heard 
numerous cases between a state and the United States in its 
original jurisdiction,2 and has even entertained suits by a 
state against the United States when there is federal 
consent.3 Furthermore, Congress has codified these rulings 
in statute, stating that “The Supreme Court shall have 
original but not exclusive jurisdiction of . . . . [a]ll 
controversies between the United States and a State.”4 
This jurisdiction, however, has been criticized from all 
corners of the legal world, from the pages of the U.S. Reports 
 
 1. 143 U.S. 621 (1892) (suit in equity brought by the United States against 
Texas to determine the boundary between that state and a territory of the United 
States). Before this landmark case, the Supreme Court heard two cases that 
included the United States as a party, although it did not consider the 
jurisdictional issue. United States v. North Carolina, 136 U.S 211 (1890) (action 
of debt at law brought by the United States against North Carolina for interest 
on bonds issued by the state); Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478 (1854) 
(United States permitted to intervene as a non-technical party in a boundary 
dispute between the two states, because the United States had granted the 
disputed lands to Florida). 
 2. See, e.g., United States v. Maine, 469 U.S. 504 (1985) (action by the United 
States against thirteen States that border the Atlantic Ocean to determine 
whether the United States has exclusive rights to the seabed and subsoil under 
the ocean off the States’ coastlines); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 
(1950) (bill in equity by the United States against Louisiana to determine and 
declare the title to tidelands off Louisiana’s coast); United States v. California, 
332 U.S. 19 (1949) (bill in equity by the United States against the State of 
California to determine which government has paramount rights in and power 
over submerged land off the coast of California); see also United States v. 
California, 436 U.S. 32 (1978); United States v. Florida, 420 U.S. 531 (1975); 
United States v. Michigan, 190 U.S. 379 (1903). 
 3. See, e.g., California v. United States, 457 U.S. 273, 277 n.6 (1982); 
California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 63, 65–68 (1979) (holding that California may 
file its bill to quiet title to the submerged lands against Arizona and the United 
States because Congress had waived federal sovereign immunity); Utah v. United 
States, 403 U.S. 9, 9–10 (1971) (resolving conflicting claims between Utah and 
the United States to the shorelands around the Great Salt Lake); see also 43 
U.S.C. §§ 615vv, 616d(e), 620m, 1551(c) (1970) (consenting to suit by a state 
under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction). 
 4. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2) (2012). 
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to those of law reviews and treatises, and Justice Harlan’s 
opinion in United States v. Texas has received sustained 
criticism for over a century. In addition to Chief Justice 
Fuller’s dissent, joined by Justice Lamar,5 Justice 
Frankfurter has called Justice Harlan’s decision “precluded” 
by the “merely literal language of the Constitution.”6 
Commentators have described Justice Harlan’s Texas 
decision as “ignoring,”7 “inconsistent with,”8 and “a single 
point of divergence from”9 the Court’s original jurisdiction 
doctrine. Others have called it “strained”10 and even 
“unconstitutional.”11 Indeed, Federal Courts textbooks 
present the puzzle to students as a seemingly irreconcilable 
paradox.12 
The problem centers on the interpretation of Article III’s 
jurisdictional “menu.”13 Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 
 
 5. 143 U.S. at 648–49 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). 
 6. Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 598 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). 
 7. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Protection of 
Economic Interests, 1889–1910, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 324, 330 n.46 (1985). 
 8. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of 
the Federal Courts, 1801–1835, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 646, 693 n.290 (1982). 
 9. Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the United States as Quasi-
International Tribunal: Reclaiming the Court’s Original and Exclusive 
Jurisdiction over Treaty-Based Suits by Foreign States Against States, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 1765, 1789 (2004). 
 10. Evan H. Caminker, State Immunity Waivers for Suits by the United 
States, 98 MICH. L. REV. 92, 103 (1999). 
 11. Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443, 489, 491 n.217 (1989) (rejecting this 
“literal” interpretation as an “‘autistic’ reading” of the Constitution’s text). 
 12. See, e.g., ROBERT N. CLINTON, ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 1434 (1996); DAVID P. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 
323 (4th ed. 1990); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 256–57 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter 
HART & WECHSLER, 6th ed.]; LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 160 (2d ed. 
2003). 
 13. For use of the term “menu” to describe the nine jurisdictional grants in 
Article III, Section 2, Clause 1, see Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of 
Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 
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outlines federal jurisdictional as follows: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, 
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to 
all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to 
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to 
Controversies between two or more States;— between a State and 
Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different States;—
between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of 
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and 
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.14 
Clause 2 of that same Section states: “In all Cases 
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, 
and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court 
shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before 
mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate 
Jurisdiction . . . .”15 
The question is, to what does “those” refer? In other 
words, over which state-party cases or controversies does the 
Supreme Court have original jurisdiction? 
Most Supreme Court cases and commentators have 
concluded that “those” refers to the three state-party-based 
jurisdictional grants from Clause 1, namely “Controversies 
between two or more States; . . . between a State and 
Citizens of another State; . . . and between a State . . . and 
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”16 Under this “diversity” 
reading of Article III, Section 2, Clause 2, the Supreme Court 
has state-party-based original jurisdiction only when the 
other party is another state(s), a citizen(s) of another state, 
or a foreign state(s), citizen(s), or subject(s). 
Not included in Clause 1’s list, however, are the words 
 
219, 245 (1985). 
 14. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 15. Id. cl. 2. 
 16. Id. cl. 1; see infra notes 57–59. 
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“Controversies between the United States and a State.” 
Instead, Clause 1 includes the broader words, “Controversies 
to which the United States shall be a Party.”17 Thus, the 
“diversity” interpretation of the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction, on the surface, would not seem to encompass 
disputes between the United States and a state. Accordingly, 
many of those who support the “diversity” reading have 
assumed the Supreme Court acted inconsistently and 
illegitimately when it exercised its original jurisdiction over 
a controversy between a state and the United States. 
On the other side are those who see United States v. 
Texas as the lone case espousing what, in their opinion, is the 
true interpretation of the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction: that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction 
over all federal question cases with a state as a party, 
regardless of the remaining party configurations.18 These 
scholars point to the Supreme Court’s later repudiation of 
this theory, most notably in Texas v. ICC,19 as inconsistent 
with United States v. Texas, and inconsistent with the 
Constitution itself. 
This Article offers a third interpretation. It argues that 
the diversity reading of the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction is correct: the Supreme Court has state-party-
based original jurisdiction only over those cases for which the 
Constitution grants federal jurisdiction on account of the 
presence of a state, i.e. suits between states, suits between a 
state and citizens of other states, and suits between a state 
and a foreign state or its citizens. The text of the 
Constitution, however, allows for one more category to be 
included with this list: suits between a state and the United 
States. Numerous delegates suggested giving the federal 
judicial power jurisdiction over controversies between the 
United States and a state, and over controversies between 
 
 17. Id. cl. 1. 
 18. See infra note 56. 
 19. 258 U.S. 158 (1922). 
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the United States and an individual. The Framers did not, 
however, enumerate all of the different United States-based 
categories over which the Constitution granted federal 
jurisdiction, i.e. State-United States cases, citizen-United 
States cases, foreign state-United States cases, foreign 
citizen-United States cases, etc. Instead, they used a single 
catch-all: “[c]ontroversies to which the United States shall be 
a [p]arty.”20 Both the delegates and the ratifiers understood 
that this provision was in fact two separate provisions: one 
over controversies between the United States and a state, 
and one over other controversies between the United States 
and an individual or foreign state. This understanding was 
informed by antecedents and expectations over what sorts of 
controversies the federal power would adjudicate. 
This Article thus presents a case-study of “collapse 
textualism.” Several times during the Philadelphia 
Convention, the Constitution’s drafters consolidated several 
more specific earlier provisions into a single general 
provision. Because of the antecedents of the Articles of 
Confederation and the English judicial procedures, however, 
both the drafters and later the ratifiers understood that the 
terse provision contained more assumptions than the bare 
words, stripped of context, would imply. 
Relying on the historical antecedents to the Supreme 
Court’s original jurisdiction, the process of drafting the 
Judiciary Article in the Constitutional Convention, and the 
ensuing ratification debates, this Article argues that the 
framers and ratifiers all assumed that the phrase, 
“Controversies to which the United States shall be a 
[p]arty,”21 was a combination of two jurisdictional grants: one 
between the United States and a state, and one between the 
United States and an individual litigant. By combining these 
two grants into the simpler formulation, the framers 
followed their general pattern of avoiding pleonasm in the 
 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 21. Id. 
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Constitution’s text. 
Thus, this Article seeks to rescue the doctrine of the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over suits between the 
United States and a state from ignominy. Further, it 
explains “collapse textualism” and the way the Framers 
spoke in a terse, abbreviated way, letting background 
assumptions inform the text. Finally, it argues that Justice 
Harlan’s opinion in United States v. Texas did not argue that 
the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over all federal 
question cases; instead, Justice Harlan made textual and 
contextual arguments in favor of jurisdiction in that case in 
particular. 
I. THE SCOPE OF THE SUPREME COURT’S ORIGINAL 
JURISDICTION 
Perhaps the most remarkable year in the history of 
popular constitutionalism occurred between the summers of 
1970 and 1971. 
On June 22, 1970, the Voting Rights Act of 1970 was 
enacted,22 which set eighteen as the voting age for federal 
and state elections.23 Almost immediately, states and the 
United States filed motions for leave to file bills of 
complaint24 against each other in the Supreme Court’s 
original jurisdiction.25 The states claimed that Congress 
“exceeded its constitutional powers and thereby usurped 
powers reposed in the states, present[ing] conflicting claims 
of governmental powers with regard to the same subject 
 
 22. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 
(1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb-1). 
 23. Id. § 302, 84 Stat. at 318. 
 24. Before an original action can be brought before the Supreme Court, the 
plaintiff must file a motion for leave to file. SUP. CT. R. 17.3. 
 25. Oregon v. Mitchell, Orig. No. 43, Texas v. Mitchell, Orig. No. 44, United 
States v. Arizona, Orig. No. 46, United States v. Idaho, Orig. No. 47, 400 U.S. 112 
(1970) (bills consolidated). 
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matter.”26 
The Supreme Court accepted the case, and on December 
21, 1970, six months after the bill had been signed, struck 
down the provision regulating state elections as 
unconstitutional.27 The Court concluded, “Congress cannot 
interfere with the age for voters set by the States for state 
and local elections.”28 
Two months later, on March 23, 1971, Congress proposed 
a constitutional amendment establishing eighteen as the 
minimum voting age for all elections,29 and it was ratified on 
July 1, 1971 as the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.30 
Thus, in the space of only twelve months, a law was 
enacted, the Supreme Court struck it down as 
unconstitutional, and the Constitution was amended to 
overturn that decision. This remarkable year belies the 
common trope that the Constitution is nearly impossible to 
amend, and demonstrates that the populace can take charge 
of its own governing document, even in the face of state 
resistance. 
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment was possible because the 
 
 26. Brief on Motion for Leave To File Complaint, at 3, Texas v. Mitchell, Orig. 
No. 44, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
 27. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970). 
 28. Id.; see id. at 125 (“[T]he whole Constitution reserves to the States the 
power to set voter qualifications in state and local elections, except to the limited 
extent that the people through constitutional amendments have specifically 
narrowed the powers of the States.”). 
 29. Proposed Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 85 Stat. 
825; S. JOURNAL, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 204 (1971); H. JOURNAL, 92d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 367 (1971). 
 30. Certification of Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
Extending the Right to Vote to Citizens Eighteen Years of Age or Older, 36 Fed. 
Reg. 12,725–26 (July 7, 1971); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (“Section 1. The 
right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to 
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of age. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article 
by appropriate legislation.”). For an analysis of the capacious scope of such 
enforcement clauses, see generally Jonathan F. Mitchell, Textualism and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1237 (2017). 
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Court immediately took up the case in its original 
jurisdiction to determine its constitutionality.31 This allowed 
the issue to remain visible, prevent malaise, and engage the 
citizenry to amend the Constitution. But was the Supreme 
Court’s review of the case in this manner legitimate? Can the 
Court hear a case between a state and (functionally) the 
United States? The Court itself declined to address the 
question. As Justice Black wrote, “[n]o question has been 
raised concerning the standing of the parties or the 
jurisdiction of this Court,” and the Court did not consider the 
justiciability of the case further.32 Where did the Supreme 
Court get the jurisdiction to decide this controversy? 
Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 contains a jurisdictional 
menu of nine items to which federal jurisdiction extends: 
The judicial Power shall extend to [1] all Cases, in Law and Equity, 
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—[2] 
to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls;—[3] to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—
[4] to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—
[5] to Controversies between two or more States;—[6] between a 
State and Citizens of another State;—[7] between Citizens of 
different States;—[8] between Citizens of the same State claiming 
Lands under Grants of different States, and [9] between a State, or 
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.33 
Clause 2 of that same Section states: 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme 
Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before 
 
 31. Cf. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (St. George Tucker ed., 
1803) (arguing that hearing state-party cases in the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction was intended to increase the “dispatch to the decision of such 
important cases, by taking away all unnecessary delays, by appeal”). 
 32. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 117 n.1. Oregon argued that it had jurisdiction based 
on South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 382 U.S. 898 (1965), but that case also did not 
address justiciability. Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Motion for Leave To File 
Complaint, Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, at 8–9 (1970) (No. 43 Orig.). 
 33. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, 
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such 
Regulations as the Congress shall make.34 
Thus, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over “those” 
disputes “in which a State shall be a Party.”35 There are three 
possible interpretations of the word “those.” It may refer to 
any case whatsoever with a state as a party, it may refer to 
any case within the federal judicial power with a state as a 
party, or it may refer only to those controversies wherein 
federal jurisdiction is granted by virtue of the presence of a 
state as a party. Below, this Article discusses each of these 
possibilities, arguing that the correct interpretation is the 
last: “those” refers only to those controversies where federal 
jurisdiction is granted on account of the presence of a state 
as a party. 
A. Any Case with a State as a Party 
First, “those” could refer to any cases whatsoever, even 
those outside of Article III’s jurisdictional menu, so long as a 
state is a party, such as a suit based entirely on state law 
between a state and one of its own citizens, or a state 
criminal prosecution based on state criminal law. In other 
words, this interpretation would read this part of Article III, 
Section 2, Clause 2 as an independent grant of jurisdiction 
over and above the jurisdictional menu of Clause 1. Neither 
justices nor scholars, however, have embraced this 
interpretation,36 and with good reason: the word “those” 
 
 34. Id. cl. 2. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Pennsylvania v. Quicksilver Co., 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 553, 556 (1871) 
(“Th[e] second clause distributes the jurisdiction conferred upon the Supreme 
Court in the previous one into original and appellate jurisdiction; but does not 
profess to confer any.”); HART & WECHSLER, 6th ed., supra note 12, at 256 (stating 
that the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over state-party cases “might have 
been construed as an independent grant of jurisdiction to hear any such case, 
whether or not it fell within one of the previously specified nine heads of 
jurisdiction. However, this broadest of possible constructions has been uniformly 
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must reference a pre-defined antecedent, as opposed to the 
universe of legal cases. Therefore, we can dispense with this 
first interpretation. 
B. Any Case Within the Federal Judicial Power Where a 
State is a Party 
Second, the word “those” could refer to all nine grants of 
federal jurisdiction. Under this reading, the Supreme Court 
would have original jurisdiction over any case within any 
federal court’s jurisdiction, so long as one party was a state. 
Thus, the Supreme Court would have original jurisdiction 
over a federal question or admiralty case between a state and 
a citizen of that state, or over a state prosecuting someone 
for violation of federal law. 
The Supreme Court has rejected this reading. In Texas 
v. ICC, for example, Texas sued the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, a federal agency, seeking a declaration that the 
Transportation Act of 1920 was unconstitutional.37 The 
Court held that the Texas railroad carriers were essential 
parties and would have to be joined, but that some of them 
were citizens of Texas.38 Therefore, the Court concluded, the 
suit would cease to be one purely between a state and 
citizen(s) of another state, and thus the Supreme Court’s 
original jurisdiction was defeated.39 The Court accordingly 
dismissed Texas’s bill, despite the case’s federal question.40 
At least one scholar has joined the Court in rejecting this 
 
rejected.”); Amar, supra note 11, at 481 (“[Such a] reading of the state party 
clause would, taken alone, seem to mean that the Supreme Court has original 
jurisdiction in a purely state law case brought by a state against its own citizens. 
Yet that surely cannot be right, for such a case does not even fall within the 
Article III jurisdictional menu . . . .”). 
 37. 258 U.S. 158, 159 (1922). 
 38. Id. at 164. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 165. 
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reading of Article III.41 
Others, however, have criticized the Supreme Court’s 
conclusion in Texas v. ICC. The Solicitor General, for 
instance, on more than one occasion has argued to the 
Supreme Court that it should overrule Texas v. ICC and hold 
that the Court’s original jurisdiction comprehends any case 
arising under any of the nine heads of federal jurisdiction if 
a state happens to be a party. The Solicitor General first took 
this position in 1973. The state of Georgia sued President 
Nixon and several federal officers, seeking a declaration that 
it was entitled to receive federal assistance under various 
federal statutes, and an order enjoining defendants from 
withholding those sums.42 Solicitor General Robert Bork 
urged the Court to grant the motion, arguing that the case 
offered “far and away the best opportunity of reaching a 
fully-informed and prompt judgment on the complex and 
profound issues at stake in the assertion of presidential 
discretion to affect rates and amounts of spending.”43 Bork 
acknowledged, however, the possible jurisdictional difficulty 
that, although all the named defendants were citizens of 
states other than Georgia, the President had nominated 
Russell Train to the position of Administrator of the EPA, 
and Train was a citizen of the District of Columbia.44 Thus, 
exercise of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction would 
conflict with the dictum in California v. Southern Pacific 
Company that the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over 
cases between a state and a citizen of another state requires 
all the defendants to be citizens of other states, and the 
District of Columbia was not another state.45 Bork suggested 
 
 41. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 11, at 489 (rejecting this “literal” interpretation 
as an “autistic reading” of the Constitution’s text). 
 42. Georgia’s Motion for Leave To File Complaint, at 19–20, Georgia v. Nixon, 
414 U.S. 810 (1973) (No. 63 Orig.). 
 43. Memorandum for the Defendants, at 2–4, Georgia v. Nixon, 414 U.S. 810 
(1973) (No. 63 Orig.). 
 44. Id. at 9–12. 
 45. California v. South Pacific Co., 157 U.S. 229, 258 (1895). 
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that the Court overrule Texas v. ICC and hold that any case 
raising a federal question in which a state is a party is within 
the Court’s original jurisdiction.46 As Bork argued, 
“[c]ertainly it seems inappropriate that issues of this Court’s 
original jurisdiction and its capacity to entertain cases of 
great constitutional moment should depend upon whether a 
nominee for an administrative position happens at the 
moment to reside in the District or in Virginia.”47 The Court 
summarily dismissed Georgia’s motion for leave to file a bill 
of complaint.48 
More than a decade later, the Solicitor General again 
opined that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over 
any case within the federal jurisdiction as long as a state is 
a party. In 1985, Indiana sued the United States in the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. It argued that Richard 
McIntyre had been “duly elected” as Representative of 
Indiana’s Eighth Congressional District at the November 6, 
1984 general election, after which Indiana certified McIntyre 
as winner of the election.49 On January 3, 1985, the House of 
Representatives passed House Resolution 1, which referred 
“the question of the right of Frank McCloskey or Richard 
McIntyre to a seat” to the Committee on House 
Administration.50 Indiana sued to enjoin the House of 
 
 46. Memorandum for the Defendants, at 11–12, Georgia v. Nixon, 414 U.S. 
810 (1973) (No. 63 Orig.) (acknowledging that the Court may have to overrule 
Texas v. ICC, 258 U.S. 158, and New Mexico v. Lane, 243 U.S. 52 (1917)). 
 47. Id. at 13. 
A number of other states, who had initiated similar causes of action in lower 
federal courts, filed a brief as Amici Curiae, arguing that the Court not grant the 
motion for leave to file a bill of complaint in the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction. They argued that the Court would be deprived of the opportunity of 
the opinions of lower federal courts, but did not raise any jurisdictional 
opposition. Brief for Amici Curiae, Georgia v. Nixon, 414 U.S. 810 (1973) (No. 63 
Orig.). 
 48. Georgia v. Nixon, 414 U.S. 810, 810 (1973). 
 49. Indiana’s Motion for Leave To File a Complaint at 3–4, Indiana v. United 
States, 471 U.S. 1123 (1985) (No. 102 Orig.). 
 50. Id. at 5. 
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Representatives from refusing to administer the oath of 
office to McIntyre.51 
Solicitor General Rex Lee stated that the United States 
opposed the bill, arguing that the case presented a non-
justiciable political question, because the matter concerns “a 
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the 
issue to a coordinate political department.”52 Lee did not, 
however, contest Indiana’s standing to bring the case. He 
acknowledged that “Indiana here has sufficiently alleged 
injury to the State in its sovereign capacity.”53 Lee then went 
further, arguing that the Court “enjoys concurrent 
jurisdiction of all cases within the federal judicial power, not 
barred by sovereign immunity, where a state is a party, 
including a suit founded on federal law by a state against its 
own citizens.”54 The Court summarily dismissed Indiana’s 
motion for leave to file a bill of complaint.55 
Some scholars, too, have argued that the original 
understanding of the word “those” extends the Court’s 
original jurisdiction to any case in the federal judicial power 
where a state is a party. Professor Pfander, for instance, has 
argued that the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction should 
be interpreted “to encompass all state-party cases, including 
federal question and admiralty cases, and not simply the 
diverse-party controversies.”56 
 
 51. Id. at 6. 
 52. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 6, Indiana v. United States, 
471 U.S. 1123 (1985) (No. 102 Orig.) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 
(1962)). 
 53. Id. at 5 n.2. 
 54. Id. at 4 n.2 (emphasis added). The House of Representatives also filed a 
Brief in Opposition, arguing that they had already sworn in McCloskey, thus 
rendering the controversy moot. Brief for the United States House of 
Representatives Defendants in Opposition at 3, Indiana v. United States, 471 
U.S. 1123 (1985) (No. 102 Orig.). 
 55. Indiana v. United States, 471 U.S. 1123, 1123 (1985). 
 56. See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original 
Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 561 (1994); id. at 560 
(“[T]he text of the clause . . . refers to state-party ‘cases’ and thus appears to 
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C. Only Those Controversies Defined by the Presence of a 
State as a Party 
Finally, the word “those” could refer only to those 
controversies that are defined by the presence of a state as a 
party. Justice Marshall endorsed this reading in his 
landmark decision Cohens v. Virginia.57 Marshall stated: 
“the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in cases 
where a State is a party, refers to those cases in which, 
according to the grant of power made in the preceding clause, 
jurisdiction might be exercised in consequence of the 
character of the party.”58 Other Supreme Court cases have 
also embraced this “diversity” reading of the Court’s original 
jurisdiction.59 This reading has further been endorsed by 
scholars, such as Professor Amar, who refers to this 
interpretation of the word “those” as the “diversity” 
 
encompass all the ‘cases’ that Article III defines as arising under federal law.”); 
see also STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 25 
(2010) (calling Marshall’s holding in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia that the 
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction “only in those cases where a state is a 
party and the case involves another state, a citizen of a different state, or a 
foreign state” a “highly dubious interpretation of the Constitution”). 
 57. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 398 (1821). 
 58. Id.; see also id. at 393–94 (“When . . . the Constitution declares the 
jurisdiction, in cases where a State shall be a party, to be original, . . . the 
conclusion seems irresistible, that its framers designed to include in th[is] . . . 
class those cases in which jurisdiction is given, because a State is a party . . . .”). 
 59. See, e.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 463–464 (1945) 
(“Clause 2 of § 2 of Article III confers on this Court jurisdiction of those cases ‘in 
which a State shall be Party.’ But Clause 2 of § 2 merely distributes the 
jurisdiction conferred by Clause 1 of § 2.”); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 
292 U.S. 313, 321 (1934) (“[W]hile Clause two of § 2 of Article III gives this Court 
original jurisdiction in those cases in which ‘a State shall be Party,’ . . . Clause 
two merely distributes the jurisdiction conferred by Clause one . . .”); Texas v. 
ICC, 258 U.S. 158, 163–65 (1922); California v. S. Pac. Co., 157 U.S. 229, 257–58 
(1895) (“The language, ‘in all cases in which a State shall be party,’ means in all 
the cases above enumerated in which a state shall be a party . . . . This second 
Clause distributes the jurisdiction conferred in the previous one into original and 
appellate jurisdiction, but does not profess to confer any. The original jurisdiction 
depends solely on the character of the parties, and is confined to the cases in 
which are those enumerated parties and those only.”); Louisiana v. Texas, 176 
U.S. 1, 15–16 (1900) (same). 
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Thus, this third “diversity” reading is the dominant 
theory of the Supreme Court’s state-party-based original 
jurisdiction.61 Many commentators, however, have argued 
that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence does not precisely 
track Cohens’s diversity interpretation of the Court’s original 
jurisdiction. These commentators state that the “diversity” 
interpretation means that the Supreme Court’s state-party-
based original jurisdiction comprehends the three cases in 
which federal jurisdiction exists based on the presence of a 
state as a party; namely, “(1) Controversies between two or 
more States; . . . (2) between a State and Citizens of another 
State; . . . and (3) between a State . . . and foreign States, 
 
 60. Amar, supra note 11, at 488–92. 
 61. Some scholars have argued that Marshall retreated from this view in 
Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110 (1828), when he noted that 
the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction would include that admiralty case to 
which a state is a party. Id. at 124 (“The decree cannot be sustained as against 
the state, because, if the 11th amendment to the Constitution, does not extend to 
proceedings in admiralty, it was a case for the original jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court.”). See, e.g., STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 619 n.2 
(10th ed. 2013); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign 
Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1967, 1967 n.427 (calling 
the opinion “irredeemably flawed as a matter of law.” “The entire edifice rested 
on two propositions, both of which were false. . . . [U]nder art. III, § 2, admiralty 
jurisdiction does not fall within the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.”); 
Pfander, supra note 56, at 644 (“In his subsequent opinion in Governor of Georgia 
v. Madrazo, moreover, Marshall casually rejects the implications of his Cohens 
dicta in holding that admiralty claims against the states were proper subjects for 
original Supreme Court cognizance . . . . If we take this reading of Madrazo 
seriously, it casts doubt on the depth of Marshall’s own commitment to a diverse-
party reading of the Original Jurisdiction Clause.”) (footnote omitted). These 
scholars are mistaken, however, and the stray line in Madrazo is perfectly 
consistent with Cohens. The Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction would have 
extended to that case, not because it was an admiralty case to which a state was 
a party, as the scholars seem to have construed Marshall’s words, but because it 
was a case between a state and a foreign citizen, Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 118 
(Marshall describing the libellant as “Juan Madrazo, a Spaniard, residing in the 
Island of Cuba”), and thus within the state-party-based jurisdiction conferred by 
Article III, Section 2, Clause 2’s conferral to the Supreme Court of original 
jurisdiction over state-party controversies. See Currie, supra note 8, at 698 n.319 
(stating Marshall found that the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over 
the case “because it was a suit between a state and a foreign national”). 
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Citizens or Subjects.”62 The line of cases asserting the Court’s 
original jurisdiction over controversies between the United 
States and a state, however, these commentators argue, 
insert an additional and extra-textual grant of jurisdiction. 
The first Justice Harlan delivered the Court’s defense of 
its original jurisdiction over state-United States disputes in 
United States v. Texas,63 and this case has been the target of 
accusations of inconsistency and illegitimacy. Justice 
Frankfurter, for instance, writing in dissent fifty years after 
United States v. Texas, stated that “the mere[] literal 
language of the Constitution precluded” the Supreme Court’s 
original jurisdiction over controversies between the United 
States and a state.64 
The Wright & Miller treatise has stated that Cohens’s 
“diversity” reading “has been flatly rejected, however, in the 
cases that establish original jurisdiction for actions between 
a state and the United States.”65 This jurisprudence 
“necessarily defeats the argument that it is limited to cases 
in which the judicial power is defined by the presence of a 
state as a party.”66 The Hart & Wechsler casebook also states 
that United States v. Texas “rejected that narrow 
 
 62. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (numbering is not in original and has been 
added for clarity). See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article 
III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 1597 n.96 (1990) (“More difficult is the question 
whether the jurisdiction extends to cases that are within the judicial power, but 
not by virtue of the fact that the state is a party—as might be true of federal 
question cases or cases in which the United States is a party. The court declined 
jurisdiction in the first situation, see California v. Southern Pacific Co., 157 U.S. 
229, 257–62 (1895), but accepted it in the second, see United States v. Texas, 143 
U.S. 621 (1892).”). 
 63. 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892). 
 64. Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 598 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting); see CHARLES EVAN HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: ITS FOUNDATION, METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 120 (1928) (calling the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over cases between the United States and 
a state “within the spirit of the Constitution although not conferred by its letter”). 
 65. 17 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 194 (3d 
ed., 2007). 
 66. Id. 
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construction” that the Court’s original jurisdiction extends 
only to state-party-based grants of jurisdiction.67 Professor 
Amar has similarly argued that 
[t]he words of Cohens, along with the textual, structural, and 
geographic arguments presented above, suggest that the Court later 
erred in upholding its original jurisdiction in a suit between the 
United States and a state (United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 
(1892)), and that 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (b)(2) (1982), giving the Court 
original jurisdiction in such a suit, is unconstitutional.68 
These scholars have not been alone in criticizing United 
States v. Texas.69 Indeed, to read Federal Courts casebooks, 
hornbooks, and treatises, it has become standard to question 
United States v. Texas and assume that it is irreconcilable 
with the Court’s original jurisdiction jurisprudence and 
clashes with the Constitution itself.70 
 
 67. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 257. 
 68. Amar, supra note 11, at 491 n.217. For another example of a scholar 
considering United States v. Texas to be irreconcilable with the Court’s doctrine, 
see Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State 
Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 11 n.45 (1989) (“[D]ifficult to justify 
doctrinally is the conclusion in United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892), that 
the United States could sue a state within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, in light of the Court’s conclusion elsewhere that the fact that a state is a 
party is insufficient, standing alone, to bring the case within the Court’s original 
jurisdiction and that only those cases to which the judicial power extends because 
of a party-alignment including a state are within the original jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 69. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 8, at 693 n.290 (“The Court’s later decision to 
entertain original jurisdiction in a controversy between the United States and a 
state, United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 643–45 (1892), is inconsistent with 
[Cohens’s] reasoning.”); Currie, supra note 7, at 330 n.46 (arguing that Justice 
Harlan in United States v. Texas “ignor[ed] Marshall’s express alternative 
holding in Cohens . . . that the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction in cases ‘in 
which a State shall be Party’ was limited to those cases in which the only basis 
of federal jurisdiction is that a state is a party”); Lee, supra note 9, at 1789–91 
(assuming that United States v. Texas was wrongly decided). 
 70. See, e.g., ROBERT N. CLINTON, ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 1434 (1996) (“[D]id the Court in United States v. Texas get it right? 
Consider the statement of the dissenters in that case”); CURRIE, supra note 12, at 
323 (“Can Texas and Cohens stand together?”); LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL 
COURTS 160 (2d ed. 2003) (“Suits in which the United States is a party are on the 
Article III menu, but not because a state is invariably a party. Accordingly, the 
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Many commentators have also criticized Justice 
Harlan’s reasoning in United States v. Texas.71 Indeed, 
scholars have assumed that Justice Harlan was here 
declaring that the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction 
over all cases arising under any head of federal jurisdiction, 
including federal question, where a state happened to be a 
party.72 
Thus, most commentators assume that either Cohens’s 
“diversity” reading is correct, in which case United States v. 
Texas was wrongly decided, or United States v. Texas was 
correct and the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over 
all federal question cases where a state is a party, in which 
case Texas v. ICC was wrongly decided. 
But perhaps these cases were all correctly decided, 
because the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over 
controversies between states, between a state and an out-of-
state-citizen, between a state and a foreign state or its 
citizens, and over a fourth category: suits between the United 
States and a state. 
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over 
controversies between a state and the United States because 
the constitutional language extending federal jurisdiction 
over controversies “to which the United States shall be a 
party” is a combination of two jurisdictional grants: over 
controversies between the United States and an individual 
state, and over controversies between the United States and 
other parties.73 This was the meaning the framers expected 
 
Court was forced to carve out an exception to the usual understanding of original 
jurisdiction[,] . . . the usual limitation of original jurisdiction to three kinds of 
diversity actions notwithstanding.”). 
 71. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 10, at 103 (“Perhaps the Court placed 
greater reliance on a structural analogy than on its strained textual claim.”). 
 72. See Pfander, supra note 56, at 574. 
 73. Professor Pfander, while expressly not endorsing this view, does suggest 
in a footnote that something like it might offer an alternative basis to justify 
United States v. Texas. See Pfander, supra note 56, at 575–76 n.77 (“[S]ubstantial 
historical support exists for reading the Court’s original jurisdiction as 
encompassing controversies between the United States and a state, even if one 
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the language to express, and was the meaning that the 
ratifiers understood the language to signify. Thus, under 
Cohens’s diversity rationale of the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction, controversies between the United States and a 
state is one of the enumerated controversies to which a state 
is a party. 
II. HISTORY OF ARTICLE III 
A. Constitutional Convention 
The records from the Philadelphia convention suggest 
that Article III’s extension of federal jurisdiction to 
“controversies to which the United States is a party” was 
understood by the framers to be a combination of two 
provisions: controversies between the United States and an 
individual state or states, and other controversies to which 
the United States is a party. 
Several early proposals specifically recognized the need 
for an arbiter over disputes between one of the United States 
and the other states assembled together as the federal 
government. Alexander Hamilton’s proposed plan, for 
 
accepts (as I do not) the Court’s assumption that its original jurisdiction focuses 
exclusively on party alignments. As originally drafted, the U.S.-party provision 
expressly embraced controversies between the United States as a party and one 
or more states or citizens. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787, at 342 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) . . . . Although the final language chosen 
refers more generally to controversies to which the U.S. shall be a party, the 
Convention apparently assumed that disputes between the United States and the 
states were encompassed within the clause. See id. at 465 (‘Mr. Madison 
considered the claim of the U.S. [to territories involved in disputes with the 
states] as in fact favored by the jurisdiction of the Judicial power of the U- S- over 
controversies to which they should be parties.’).”); see also Caminker, supra note 
10, at 103, 103 n.62 (suggesting that this thesis may be the “best support for the 
Court’s holding that United States-against-state suits fall within its original 
jurisdiction” and further suggesting that it might be bolstered by the following 
citation: “THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961) (‘Controversies between the nation and its members [meaning states] 
or citizens can only be properly referred to the national tribunals. Any other plan 
would be contrary to reason, to precedent, and to decorum.’).”). 
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instance, would have given the Supreme Court “original 
jurisdiction in all cases in which the United States shall be a 
party, in all controversies between the United States, and a 
particular State.”74 Under Hamilton’s plan, controversies 
between a state and the United States over “claim of 
territory” were to be subject to a complex special court 
reminiscent of that under the Articles of Confederation.75 
Similarly, Paterson appended to his New Jersey Plan the 
resolution “that provision ought to be made for hearing and 
deciding upon all disputes arising between the United States 
and an individual State respecting territory.”76 
Later in the convention, on August 20, 1787, when the 
draft constitution did not yet provide for jurisdiction over any 
cases where the United States was a party, Madison and 
Pinckney submitted to the Committee of Detail the 
resolution that “[t]he Jurisdiction of the supreme Court shall 
be extended to all controversies between the U.S. and an 
individual State, or the U.S. and the Citizens of an individual 
State.”77 Two days later, on August 22, Rutledge reported 
that the Committee had considered the proposal and 
recommended adding to the federal jurisdiction 
controversies “between the United States and an individual 
State, or the United States and an individual person.”78 
A few days later, on August 27, Rutledge assumed that 
 
 74. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 626 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS]. It is not clear when 
Hamilton composed this plan, nor with whom he shared it. It varies considerably 
from the plan he presented to the convention on June 18. Id. at 617–18. Some 
have argued that Hamilton composed this later draft sometime near the end of 
the convention, 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 253 n.2 (Harold C. Syrett, 
ed., 1962), while other have argued it was contemporaneous with his June 18 
speech, 3 JOHN C. HAMILTON, LIFE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: A HISTORY OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 284–302 (1879). 
 75. FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 74, at 626. 
 76. Id. at 611 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 77. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 342 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1911) . 
 78. Id. at 367. 
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the Supreme Court would have original jurisdiction over 
cases between a state and the United States. The convention 
was discussing tenure of federal judges. John Dickinson 
moved to amend the draft constitution by adding, after the 
words “good behavior,” the words “provided that they may be 
removed by the Executive on the application [by] the Senate 
and House of Representatives.”79 Rutledge opposed the 
amendment, stating, “[i]f the supreme Court is to judge 
between the U.S. and particular States, this alone is an 
insuperable objection to the motion.”80 In other words, 
because the Supreme Court would hear cases between the 
United States and an individual state, it was necessary that 
the justices be entirely independent of the whims of the 
Executive and Legislative branches, lest their votes be 
swayed. 
Madison and Morris then moved to add to the Judiciary 
Article a grant of federal jurisdiction over controversies “to 
which the United States shall be a Party,” which was 
approved.81 Because Madison had been the one to 
recommend extending the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to 
“all controversies between the U.S. and an individual state, 
or the U.S. and the citizens of an individual state,” it is 
reasonable to assume that his proposal to add jurisdiction 
over controversies “to which the United States shall be a 
party,” was a combination of those two categories. The 
convention approved this addition.82 
The convention then voted to extend the Supreme 
Court’s original jurisdiction to controversies to which the 
United States was a party, in addition to state-party 
controversies.83 The convention then immediately changed 
its mind, and removed the Court’s original jurisdiction over 
 
 79. Id. at 428. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 423, 430. 
 82. See id. at 424. 
 83. Id. 
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all United-States-party cases.84 Although there is no 
recorded debate over this abrupt about-face, it is likely that 
the convention recognized that, while it did want the 
Supreme Court to have original jurisdiction over cases 
between the United States and an individual state, it did not 
want it to have original jurisdiction over every controversy 
the United States had with any individual person. 
Soon thereafter, on August 30, the delegates engaged in 
a discussion that shows they assumed that competing claims 
between the United States and a state would be litigated 
before the Supreme Court.85 While discussing what would 
become Article IV, Daniel Carroll of Maryland moved to add 
the words “Provided nevertheless that nothing in this 
Constitution shall be construed to affect the claim of the U.S. 
to vacant lands ceded to them by the Treaty of peace.”86 
Carroll stated that he meant this to apply both to lands 
claimed by particular states, and those not claimed by any 
particular states.87 Madison stated that, while he thought it 
best to be silent, he felt that if such a provision were 
included, it should also “declare that the claims of particular 
States also should not be affected.”88 
Carroll withdrew his motion, and moved in its stead: 
“Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to alter the 
claims of the U.S. or of the individual States to the Western 
territory, but all such claims shall be examined into & 
decided upon, by the Supreme Court of the U. States.”89 
Morris moved that this be changed as follows: 
 
 84. Id. It was moved to add: “[b]ut in cases in which the United States shall 
be a Party ‘the jurisdiction shall be original or appellate as the Legislature may 
direct,’” but this motion was voted down. Id. at 424–25. 
 85. Id. at 465. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 465–66. 
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The Legislature shall have power to dispose of and make all needful 
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property 
belonging to the U. States; and nothing in this constitution 
contained, shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims either of 
the U— S— or of any particular State . . . .90 
This was unanimously approved.91 
Luther Martin moved to add to this provision lines that 
Carroll had included but which Morris had omitted: “[b]ut all 
such claims may be examined into & decided upon by the 
supreme Court of the U—States.”92 Morris stated that “this 
is unnecessary, as all suits to which the U. S— are parties— 
are already to be decided by the Supreme Court.”93 Martin 
insisted, arguing that “it is proper in order to remove all 
doubts on this point.”94 Martin’s amendment was voted 
down.95 
This exchange reveals two assumptions shared by the 
delegates to the Philadelphia convention. First, it shows that 
the delegates recognized that there could arise boundary 
disputes or competing claims to land between the United 
States and a particular state. Second, it shows that the 
delegates assumed such claims would be heard by the 
Supreme Court in the first instance. 
Thus, as the convention proceedings show, the 
constitutional language “[c]ontroversies to which the United 
States shall be a [p]arty”96 was the combination of two 
jurisdictional grants, one over controversies between the 
United States and an individual state, and one over 
controversies between the United States and other parties. 
 
 90. Id. at 466. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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Such a combination was a natural linguistic choice that 
privileged brevity without sacrificing precision. 
B. Ratification 
The ratification debates also reveal that the voters 
understood the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to 
extend to cases between the United States and a state. The 
convention debates contain precious little exposition of 
Article III.97 Nevertheless, those authors that do discuss the 
provision confirm that the public meaning of the relevant 
language was the same as the framers at the Philadelphia 
convention expected it to express. 
Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No. 80, discussed the 
federal judiciary’s jurisdiction over “controversies to which 
the United States shall be a party,” and defined it just as the 
framers had in convention: as a combination of controversies 
between the United States and a state, and controversies 
between the United States and other parties. Hamilton 
justified federal jurisdiction over “all those [causes] in which 
the United States are a party,” by stating: “Still less need be 
said in regard to [this] point. Controversies between the 
nation and its members or citizens, can only be properly 
referred to the national tribunals.”98 By “members” of the 
nation, Hamilton was referring to the states. Similarly, 
James Wilson, in a speech to the Pennsylvania ratification 
convention on December 7, 1787, while discussing the grant 
of federal jurisdiction over “controversies to which the United 
States shall be a party,” argued that the federal judiciary 
would prevail when states “should be engaged in a 
 
 97. See, e.g., Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 600 (1918) (“[I]n the 
Convention, so far as the published debates disclose, the [judiciary] provisions . . . 
were adopted without debate.”); MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 154 (1913) (“[T]here is surprisingly little on 
the subject [of the judiciary] to be found in the records of the convention.”). 
 98. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & 
James McClellan eds., 2001) (emphasis added). 
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controversy with the United States.”99 
Even those who had not been at the Philadelphia 
convention assumed that the Supreme Court would have 
original jurisdiction over controversies between the United 
States and a state. The pseudonymous author Aristides 
described the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction as 
extending to, among other party configurations, “1. Cases 
between the United States, and one or more of the individual 
states.”100 As Samuel Osgood wrote to Samuel Adams on 
January 5, 1788, “[w]here the united States are a Party 
against a State the supreme Judicial Court have expressly 
original Jurisdiction.”101 Indeed, Osgood continued, if any 
state should object to an act of Congress, “the legal Remedy 
is to try the Question before the supreme Judicial Court.’102 
C. The First Decade 
There is ample evidence from the Republic’s first decade 
showing the general understanding that Article III granted 
the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over cases between 
a state and the United States. 
The Georgia House of Representatives, for instance, had 
occasion, while Chisholm v. Georgia103 was pending in the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, to give its 
interpretation of the scope of that jurisdiction. After Georgia 
 
 99. See James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, reprinted in 1 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 247 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 
2007). 
 100. Aristides, reprinted in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 533 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino 
eds., 1984) [hereinafter DHRC]. 
 101. Letter from Samuel Osgood to Samuel Adams (January 5, 1788), reprinted 
in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 619 
(John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1984). Osgood feared that the 
Supreme Court would exercise its equitable powers over such legal suits to 
vindicate congressional statutes that violate the Constitution. See id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
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refused to appear before the Supreme Court, the Georgia 
House of Representatives passed a resolution, stating that 
Article III gave the Supreme Court the power “to hear and 
determine” only those “causes commenced by a state as a 
plaintiff against a citizen as defendant, or in cases where two 
states are parties or between the United States and an 
individual state.”104 
St. George Tucker similarly interpreted the Court’s 
original jurisdiction to extend to state-United States 
controversies. As he put it in his Commentaries on 
Blackstone, “[a]s here applied [in the Clause granting federal 
jurisdiction over ‘controversies to which the United States 
shall be a party’], it seems particularly appropriate to such 
disputes as might arise between the U. States, and any one 
or more states, respecting territorial, or fiscal, matters.”105 
Representative Samuel Dana, during the debates over 
the 1802 Judiciary Act, gave an extended disquisition, 
describing the importance of having a tribunal to decide 
controversies that might arise between states or between a 
state and the United States: 
[T]here were . . . various restrictive provisions in the Constitution, 
which appear framed to guard against evils which might be 
apprehended from the change of system. Restrictions were imposed 
on the powers of Congress, and the respective states. Some of the 
restrictions, undoubtedly, were to guard individuals against public 
oppression; and some, to guard the particular States against the 
Government of the United States, or against each other. 
Controversies were known to exist between particular States and 
others might be expected to arise, as well as controversies between 
a State and the United States. The parties in such controversies 
would be powerful, each might put armed forces in motion. When 
provision was to be made for questions of this nature, who could 
hesitate to acknowledge the importance of establishing an impartial 
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tribunal beyond the immediate control of either party? A tribunal, 
the constitution of which might inspire general confidence, and 
thereby prevent the recourse to a very different mode of deciding 
conflicting pretensions.106 
Similarly, Section 13 of the First Judiciary Act defined 
the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction: 
Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies 
of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state 
and its citizens; and except also between a state and citizens of other 
states, or aliens, in which latter case it shall have original but not 
exclusive jurisdiction.107 
According to this Section, the Supreme Court was to 
have original jurisdiction over all civil controversies where a 
state is a party, except between a state and its own citizens, 
thus including United States-state disputes. 
Professor Thomas Lee argues that the Judiciary Act’s 
explicit exclusion of cases between a state and in-state 
citizens from the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction shows 
that its drafters may not have considered the Court’s original 
jurisdiction to be limited to the “diversity” reading of Article 
III. 
[W]hy did the First Congress bother to rule out State-versus-state-
citizen suits in section 13 of the Judiciary Act? That is, it would have 
been superfluous to say ‘except between a state and its citizens’ if 
the only possible litigants in State-party cases were those named as 
adverse parties to States in the list of ‘Controversies,’ since there is 
no mention of ‘Controversies’ between a State and its citizens.108 
Lee concludes that, either the Judiciary Act’s drafters 
thought that the Court’s original jurisdiction encompassed 
any case falling within the federal judicial power to which a 
state was a party, or went out of their way to make it clear 
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that the Constitution gave the Court original jurisdiction 
only in the three state-as-party configurations.109 
In fact, Section 13 was just demonstrating a version of 
“collapse textualism.” In the Constitution, the state-party 
controversies are enumerated: state-state, state-out of state 
citizen, and state-foreign state or foreign citizen. State-
United States disputes are included in the broader category 
of all “[c]ontroversies to which the United States shall be a 
[p]arty.”110 What is left? Suits between a state and its own 
citizens. As this would likely be the bulk of litigation the 
state would undertake, this was no small prohibition. But 
how to express it? There are two ways. One is to enumerate 
each instance, as the Constitution did in this case. But 
another way is to consolidate the provisions and point out 
what is missing: all controversies where a state is a party, 
except between a state and its citizen. 
Indeed, the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors 
interpreted Section 13 of the First Judiciary Act just this 
way, as giving the Supreme Court original jurisdiction “in 
controversies of a civil nature, between the United States 
and a particular State—and between particular states.”111 
As this Section has argued, the Constitution’s grant of 
federal jurisdiction over “[c]ontroversies to which the United 
States shall be a [p]arty”112 is in fact the combination of a 
grant over controversies between a state and the United 
States, and a grant over controversies between the United 
States and other parties. Moreover, framers, ratifiers, and 
individuals all understood this to be the case. This provision 
thus presents a case-study of “collapse textualism.” 
The Constitution is a terse document. At a little over 
four-thousand words, it was meant to be easily read and 
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easily understood. To accomplish this feat of brevity, the 
Framers worked hard to abbreviate the words whenever they 
could. They relied on antecedents and background 
assumptions to ensure that the text’s meaning would be 
understood. To unwrap these packages of meaning today, it 
is necessary to understand background assumptions. 
For instance, in the draft constitution reported by the 
Committee of Detail on August 6, 1787, the Senate was given 
jurisdiction over “all Disputes and Controversies . . . between 
two or more States respecting jurisdiction or territory,” while 
the judiciary was given jurisdiction over “[c]ontroversies 
between States, except those which regard Jurisdiction or 
Territory.”113 When these two jurisdictions were consolidated 
in the federal judiciary, the drafter did not write out that the 
judiciary had jurisdiction over controversies between states, 
both those respecting jurisdiction and territory and those not 
respecting jurisdiction and territory, even though such 
jurisdiction was not an obvious common law court power. 
Instead, they abbreviated the two provisions into the words, 
“Controversies between two or more States.” 
III. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Florida v. Georgia 
The Supreme Court first had occasion to consider the 
presence of the United States as a party in an original 
jurisdiction case in Florida v. Georgia,114 although the Court 
would not squarely address whether its original jurisdiction 
comprehended a controversy between a state and the United 
States for four more decades. 
In 1850, Florida filed a bill against Georgia in the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to resolve a boundary 
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dispute.115 In 1854, the United States moved to intervene 
because it had granted Florida the lands in dispute, lands 
that Georgia claimed to have owned all along.116 The United 
States argued that it had a responsibility to its grantees to 
intervene in the suit.117 Further, as the Attorney General 
argued, the United States has “a general interest in the 
question of the boundaries of States.”118 The Attorney 
General wanted to intervene “not as a technical party, . . . 
but free to co-operate with, or to oppose both, or either, and 
to bring forth all the points of the case according to his own 
judgment.”119 
Both Georgia and Florida opposed the motion, arguing 
that the addition of the United States as a party would 
remove the case from the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction.120 
Chief Justice Taney, writing for the majority, found that 
the United States could intervene as a non-technical 
party.121 He reasoned that, although the case was a boundary 
dispute between two states, “there are twenty-nine other 
States, who are also interested in the adjustment of this 
boundary, whose interests are represented by the United 
States. Justice certainly requires that they should be heard 
before their rights are concluded by the judgment of the 
court.”122 The United States would not be able “to interfere 
in the pleading, or evidence, or admissions of the States,” but 
would be able to offer its own evidence and arguments.123 
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The case featured two dissenting opinions. Justice Curtis 
stated that the Constitution divided that Court’s jurisdiction 
into two classes, original and appellate.124 Because all those 
cases that were not defined by the presence of a state were 
therefore not part of the Court’s original jurisdiction, 
controversies to which the United States were a party must 
“come under the appellate jurisdiction of this court in this 
distribution of jurisdiction by the constitution,” and therefore 
were not included in the Court’s original jurisdiction.125 
Justice Campbell, in his companion dissent, offered an 
historical elaboration on the claim that the presence of the 
United States as a party removed the case from the Supreme 
Court’s original jurisdiction: 
There were before the federal convention propositions to extend the 
judicial powers to questions “which involve the national peace and 
harmony;” “to controversies between the United States and an 
individual State;” and in the modified form, “to examine into and 
decide upon the claims of the United States and an individual State 
to territory.” None were incorporated into the constitution, and the 
last was peremptorily rejected.126 
 
 124. Id. at 504 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (“In distributing this jurisdiction, the 
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B. United States v. Texas 
On May 2, 1890, Congress passed a statute directing the 
Attorney General to file a bill of equity in the Supreme 
Court’s original jurisdiction to determine whether Greer 
County was within the jurisdiction of Texas or was a 
territory of the United States.127 The statute stated that it 
desired the controversy to be heard in the Court’s original 
jurisdiction “in order to provide for a speedy and final judicial 
determination of the controversy.”128 
The Attorney General accordingly filed a bill of equity in 
the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to “determin[e] and 
settl[e] the true boundary line between the United States 
and the State of Texas.”129 Texas demurred to the bill, 
arguing, among other things, that the Supreme Court’s 
original jurisdiction did not extend to suits between the 
United States and Texas.130 
In an opinion written by Justice Harlan, the Court 
granted the motion for leave to file the bill of complaint, 
deciding that it did have jurisdiction over the case. Justice 
Harlan noted that, under the Articles of Confederation, that 
congress was given power to decide all disputes or differences 
“‘between two or more States, concerning boundary, 
jurisdiction, or any other cause whatever.’”131 The First 
Judiciary Act, Harlan continued, gave “exclusive 
jurisdiction” to the Supreme Court of all controversies to 
which a state was a party, save for those between a state and 
its own citizens.132 “Why then may not this court take 
original cognizance of the present suit involving a question 
of boundary between a Territory of the United States and a 
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State?”133 
Justice Harlan then underwent an analysis of Article III 
that has never been accused of being perspicuous.134 It has 
generally been assumed that Harlan’s opinion stands for the 
proposition that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction 
over any case arising under any head of federal jurisdiction, 
so long as a state happens to be a party.135 Such an 
interpretation of Harlan’s words, this Article maintains, is 
mistaken, though hardly inexcusable, given the opinion’s 
circuitous and opaque language. Instead, Harlan makes a 
sort of a fortiori argument, in which he argues that, if the 
Supreme Court was given jurisdiction over boundary 
disputes between states, then all the more must that Court 
have jurisdiction over a boundary dispute between the 
United States and a state. 
As Harlan put it, “[t]he important question therefore, is, 
whether this court can, under the Constitution, take 
cognizance of an original suit brought by the United States 
against a State to determine the boundary between one of 
the Territories and such State.”136 If the framers gave the 
Supreme Court original jurisdiction over disputes between 
states, then certainly they must have given the Court 
jurisdiction over disputes between the United States and a 
state. As Harlan put it, “the framers of the Constitution did 
provide, by that instrument, for the judicial determination of 
all cases in law and equity between two or more States, 
including those involving questions of boundary.”137 Harlan 
then asked rhetorically, “[d]id they omit to provide for the 
judicial determination of controversies arising between the 
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United States and one or more of the States of the Union?”138 
Obviously not, is the assumed answer. 
Harlan’s next point was based on the intent of the 
framers of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The suit between the 
United States and Texas, Harlan reasoned, was 
unquestionably within Article III’s description of federal 
jurisdiction. First, it concerned the interpretation of treaties, 
and therefore arose under federal question jurisdiction.139 
Second, it was a case in which the United States is a party.140 
Thus, the case certainly was one that is comprehended by 
Article III jurisdiction. The first Congress, however, gave 
exclusive jurisdiction of a controversy between the United 
States and a state to the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction. As Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 stated, 
“the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all 
controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, 
except between a state and its citizens; and except also 
between a state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in 
which latter case it shall have original but not exclusive 
jurisdiction.”141 This language was still the law in 1892. 
Harlan stated that “[s]uch exclusive jurisdiction was given to 
this Court because it best comported with the dignity of a 
State that a case in which it was a party should be 
determined in the highest, rather than in a subordinate, 
judicial tribunal of the nation.”142 Again, Harlan resorted to 
a fortiori, rhetorical embellishment: “Why then may not this 
court take original cognizance of the present suit involving a 
question of boundary between a Territory of the United 
States and a State?”143 
Harlan did not argue that the Constitution’s words 
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giving the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in those 
controversies “in which a state shall be party” referred to all 
nine jurisdictional grants from the preceding Clause, as has 
often been assumed. Instead, he argued that the Supreme 
Court’s original jurisdiction over state-party controversies 
“necessarily refer[red] to all cases mentioned in the 
preceding clause in which a State may be made, of right, a 
party defendant, or in which a State may, of right, be a party 
plaintiff.”144 By those cases “in which a state may be made of 
right a party,” thus, Harlan was referring to a subset of 
federal jurisdiction. Indeed, the term “of right” suggests that 
Harlan was repeating Cohens’s conclusion that the Court’s 
original jurisdiction comprehends those cases where 
“jurisdiction might be exercised in consequence of the 
character of the [state as a] party.”145 
In elaborating on his “of right” terminology, Harlan 
wrote several sentences that form the basis for the 
conclusion by some scholars that Harlan endorsed Supreme 
Court original jurisdiction over any federal question case in 
which a state happened to be a party: 
Besides, unless a State is exempt altogether from suit by the United 
States, we do not perceive upon what sound rule of construction 
suits brought by the United States in this court—especially if they 
be suits the correct decision of which depends upon the 
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States—are to be 
excluded from its original jurisdiction as defined in the 
Constitution. That instrument extends the judicial power of the 
United States “to all cases,” in law and equity, arising under the 
Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, and to 
controversies in which the United States shall be a party, and 
confers upon this Court original jurisdiction “in all cases . . . in 
which a State shall be party,” that is, in all cases mentioned in the 
preceding clause in which a State may of right be made a party 
defendant, as well as in all cases in which a State may, of right, 
institute a suit in a court of the United States. The present case is 
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of the former class.146 
Again, however, this portion of Harlan’s argument is 
based not on the presence of a federal question—a point that 
only serves to heighten the appropriateness of the suit for a 
federal court—but on Harlan’s term “of right.” A suit 
between the United States and a state is one of those 
disputes “in which a state may of right be made a party 
defendant.” 
Harlan then reiterated his main point, namely that the 
Court’s original jurisdiction over a controversy between a 
state and the United States follows a fortiori from the grant 
of jurisdiction over disputes between states. 
We cannot assume that the framers of the Constitution, while 
extending the judicial power of the United States to controversies 
between two or more States of the Union, and between a State of 
the Union and foreign states, intended to exempt a State altogether 
from suit by the General Government. They could not have 
overlooked the possibility that controversies, capable of judicial 
solution, might arise between the United States and some of the 
States, and that the permanence of the Union might be endangered 
if to some tribunal was not entrusted the power to determine them 
according to the recognized principles of law. And to what tribunal 
could a trust so momentous be more appropriately committed than 
to that which the people of the United States, in order to form a 
more perfect Union, establish justice and insure domestic 
tranquility, have constituted with authority to speak for all the 
people and all the States, upon questions before it to which the 
judicial power of the nation extends? It would be difficult to suggest 
any reason why this court should have jurisdiction to determine 
questions of boundary between two or more States, but not 
jurisdiction of controversies of like character between the United 
States and a State.147 
Thus Harlan’s main point here and throughout the 
opinion is that the jurisdiction is logically and structurally 
implicit and necessary, following as a matter of course from 
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jurisdiction over disputes between states. The Constitution 
must, Harlan argues, have given the Court original 
jurisdiction over cases between a state and the United 
States. As the Supreme Court stated four decades later, 
“[w]hile that jurisdiction is not conferred by the Constitution 
in express words, it is inherent in the constitutional plan.”148 
Chief Justice Fuller, joined by Justice Lamar, delivered 
a terse dissent: 
This court has original jurisdiction of two classes of cases only, those 
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and 
those in which a State shall be a party. 
 The judicial power extends to “controversies between two or more 
States;” “between a State and citizens of another State;” and 
“between a State or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens 
or subjects.” Our original jurisdiction, which depends solely upon 
the character of the parties, is confined to the cases enumerated, in 
which a State may be a party, and this is not one of them. 
 The judicial power also extends to controversies to which the 
United States shall be a party, but such controversies are not 
included in the grant of original jurisdiction. To the controversy 
here the United States is a party. 
 We are of opinion, therefore, that this case is not within the 
original jurisdiction of the court.149 
Chief Justice Fuller had the opportunity only three years 
later to assert his vision of the scope of the Court’s original 
jurisdiction, in California v. Southern Pacific Railroad.150 
California filed a bill in equity against the Kentucky 
corporation Southern Pacific Railroad, arguing that the 
state, and not the Railroad, was the owner of the entire San 
Francisco Bay, including all submerged lands.151 California 
acknowledged that by certain statutes it had purported to 
transfer that ownership to the Town of Oakland, and that 
Oakland, in turn, had transferred ownership to the Southern 
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Pacific Railroad.152 California argued, however, that 
the state of California was admitted into the Union under an act of 
congress approved September 9, 1850, with certain specified bound-
aries, . . . that the state, upon its admission into the Union, acquired 
and continued to retain jurisdiction over the soil of the beds of [the] 
bay . . . and absolute title to the same, subject only to the right of 
the United States of supervision over the navigable waters of the 
bay.153 
California argued that the lands were “incapable of 
alienation to any person, or of being reduced to private 
ownership.” Therefore, California’s bill sought “a decree 
adjudging that the state could not make such a grant to the 
town.”154 
Chief Justice Fuller, writing for the majority, held that 
the City of Oakland was a necessary party to the 
proceedings; the presence of Oakland as a party, however, 
would make the controversy, at least in part, one between a 
state and a citizen of that state.155 This, Chief Justice Fuller 
concluded, would divest the Court of original jurisdiction: 
Under the Constitution the cases in which a State may be a party 
are those between two or more States; between a State and citizens 
of another State; between a State and foreign States, citizens, or 
subjects; and between the United States and a State, as held in 
United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621. By the Constitution and 
according to the statute this court has exclusive jurisdiction of all 
controversies of a civil nature where a State is a party, but not of 
controversies between a State and its own citizens, and original but 
not exclusive jurisdiction of controversies between a State and 
citizens of another State or aliens.156 
Fuller then recognized that a federal question may be 
involved, but that nevertheless the Court’s original 
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jurisdiction did not exist merely because a case comes under 
the federal judicial power and a state happens to be a party. 
Instead, it must be a case between states, between a state 
and an out-of-state citizen, between a state and the United 
States, or between a state and a foreign state or citizen. 
[W]e are not called on to consider . . . whether any Federal question 
is involved, since the original jurisdiction of this court in cases 
between a State and citizens of another State rests upon the 
character of the parties and not at all upon the nature of the case. 
If, by virtue of the subject-matter, a case comes within the judicial 
power of the United States, it does not follow that it comes within 
the original jurisdiction of this court. That jurisdiction does not 
obtain simply because a State is a party. Suits between a State and 
its own citizens are not included within it by the Constitution; nor 
are controversies between citizens of different States.157 
Justice Harlan delivered a lengthy dissent, which 
Justice Brewer joined. Tellingly, however, Justice Harlan 
never articulated the principle for which later commentators 
have cited his United States v. Texas opinion, namely that 
the Court has original jurisdiction over any federal question 
case where a state happens to be a party. Considering his 
Texas opinion had been written only three years before, if 
Fuller’s opinion was rejecting his reasoning, it would be 
natural to expect Harlan to mention it somewhere in his long 
dissent. Instead, Harlan dissented on completely different 
grounds. Harlan argued that Oakland should be admitted as 
a non-technical party, much as the United States was 
allowed to do in Florida v. Georgia.158 
It seems to me that according to both the letter and spirit of the 
Constitution this court cannot refuse to exercise its original 
jurisdiction over a controversy between a State and a citizen of 
another State, because a citizen of the plaintiff State has or may 
assert some interest in the subject-matter of that controversy; and 
that in such a case it is our duty either to permit the latter citizen 
to be heard without becoming a party of record if thereby our 
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jurisdiction would be defeated, or proceed to a decree between the 
original parties to the controversy, leaving unaffected, in law, the 
rights of others.159 
Thus, Harlan never articulated the position that the 
Court had jurisdiction over any case falling within the 
judicial power of the United States to which a state happened 
to be a party, neither in 1892, nor in 1895. 
IV. REBUTTING COUNTERARGUMENTS 
Some scholars have argued that in fact it makes sense 
for the framers not to have given the Supreme Court original 
jurisdiction over controversies between a state and the 
United States. Professor Thomas Lee, for instance, has given 
three reasons why the framers would not have given the 
Court original jurisdiction over cases between the United 
States and a state. 
First, Lee argues that, while the Supreme Court might 
be a neutral forum to adjudicate disputes between states, or 
between a state and a citizen of another state, or between a 
state and a foreign state or citizen, it would not be a neutral 
forum in a dispute between a state and the United States.160 
“The crucial aspect of neutrality . . . would be more suspect 
from the State’s perspective if the Supreme Court were to 
serve as tribunal in a dispute between it and a coordinate 
branch of the national government.”161 This objection, 
however, would apply, not merely to the Supreme Court’s 
original jurisdiction, but to any case where the United States 
was a party in any federal court. Because every federal court 
constitutes a portion of one branch of the federal 
government, and the Executive, a coordinate branch of the 
federal government, would necessarily represent the United 
States in the controversy, any federal court would present 
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this neutrality problem in a United-States-party case. This 
argument thus seems to prove too much. 
Second, Lee argues that the framers did not extend the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to controversies 
between the United States and a state because it would not 
“have been clear at the time of the founding how the Court 
could have enforced a decision adverse to the United States 
in a civil suit.”162 Once again, however, this argument seems 
prove too much, because any suit involving the United States 
in any federal court, whether or not a state is a party, would 
present the same problems, especially considering that, even 
when the United States is the plaintiff, a private defendant 
could present counterclaims.163 
Third, Lee suggests that the framers may never have 
considered the possibility of suits between a state and the 
United States: “As the alternative of state court forum would 
be equally unattractive from the United States’ perspective, 
it is possible that the Framers did not consider United 
States-versus-State controversies amenable to federal or 
state judicial solution.” As this Article has already posited, 
however, the framers, both within the Philadelphia 
convention and during the ratification debates, did consider 
the possibility of suits between the United States and a state 
and assumed that they would be heard by the Supreme Court 
in its original jurisdiction.164 
There have been several other attempts to rationalize 
the holding of United States v. Texas with the Constitution. 
First, the traditional interpretation of the case has been that 
it extends the Court’s original jurisdiction to any case within 
the federal judicial power to which a state happens to be a 
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party. As discussed above, some commentators have 
defended this theory as the “better view.” But this argument 
presents its own difficulties. Consider the assortment of 
cases over which the Supreme Court would have original 
jurisdiction. First, the Court would have jurisdiction to hear 
criminal cases. States could prosecute federal officers acting 
under federal statutes for violating state criminal law in the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, even if that officer was 
a citizen of that state.165 Indeed, considering that every state 
criminal prosecution contains “federal ingredients”166 in the 
form of constitutionally protected procedural rights, any 
state prosecution could be pursued in the Court’s original 
jurisdiction under this theory. Moreover, because the well-
pleaded complaint rule is statutory and does not apply to the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, any civil case brought 
by a state against any party, so long as there is a federal 
ingredient in it, would be amenable to the Court’s original 
jurisdiction. Any admiralty case or diversity case where a 
state was a party could also be brought in the Court’s original 
jurisdiction. 
Professor Amar, several decades after calling the case 
“unconstitutional,” offered an alternative justification for 
United States v. Texas. Saying that Texas “muddied the 
waters, slightly,” he argued that “[t]he result of this case can 
be best reconciled with Marshall’s approach [in Cohens] by 
viewing the lawsuit in question as a de facto controversy 
between one state (Texas) and its sister states (represented 
 
 165. Ever since 1815, Congress has considered state prosecutions of federal 
officers acting under color of federal law to be comprehended within the 
Constitution’s grant of federal question jurisdiction, Act of Feb. 4, 1815, 3 Stat. 
195, 198, and the Supreme Court has upheld this jurisdiction. Tennessee v. 
Davis, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 257, 302 (1880). 
 166. Justice Marshall interpreted the Constitution’s scope of federal question 
jurisdiction as follows: “[W]hen a question to which the judicial power of the 
Union is extended by the Constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, 
it is in the power of Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause.” 
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824). 
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by the federal government itself).”167 Under this rationale, 
United States v. Texas actually arises under the grant of 
jurisdiction over “[c]ontroversies between two or more 
States.”168 This approach finds support in Chief Justice 
Taney’s opinion in Florida v. Georgia, in which the Court 
allowed the United States to intervene as a non-technical 
party in a controversy between two states. Taney 
characterized the United States’ interest as representing 
that of all other states, arguing that, although it was “a suit 
between two States,” there were “twenty-nine other States, 
who are also interested in the adjustment of this boundary, 
whose interests are represented by the United States.”169 
Professor Amar’s rationale, however, also seems to prove 
too much. If the United States as a party is a “state” for the 
purposes of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction 
whenever it represents all (other) states—this presumably 
being some subset of the capacities in which the United 
States could be a party—then the Supreme Court would have 
original jurisdiction in any controversy where the United 
States is a party in its all-states-representative capacity, 
regardless of who the other party is, whether a citizen, a 
foreign state, or any other party.170 
 
 167. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 580 n.52 
(2006). 
 168. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
 169. Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 494 (1854). For another example 
of the Court considering the United States, when a party litigant, as the 
representative of the other states, see Chief Justice John Jay explaining why the 
Constitution gave federal courts jurisdiction over controversies to which the 
United States is a party: “[B]ecause, in cases in which the whole people are 
interested, it would not be equal or wise to let one State decide and measure out 
the justice due to others.” Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 475 (1793). 
 170. See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 583 n.3 (1943) (“The 
Constitution confers original jurisdiction . . . [over] ‘those in which a State shall 
be Party’ . . . . The United States has never been held to be a ‘State’ within this 
provision—and it obviously is not . . . .”); United States v. West Virginia, 295 U.S. 
463, 470 (1935) (“Our original jurisdiction does not include suits of the United 
States against persons or corporations alone . . . .”). As discussed above, there 
was a moment when the Philadelphia convention had approved an amendment 
to the draft constitution which gave the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over 
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In the Third Edition of Hart & Wechsler, the editors 
offered a third possible justification for United States v. 
Texas. The Casebook suggested that “the jurisdiction 
distributed in the second clause [i.e. ‘those in which a State 
is party’] extends only to those classes of cases in the first 
clause which are described in terms of parties rather than of 
subject matter.”171 This explanation too, however, sweeps too 
broadly. Included in the class of cases “described in terms of 
parties rather than of subject matter” are controversies 
between citizens of different states. Neither the Court nor 
any commentator, however, has ever thought that its 
original jurisdiction would extend to a controversy brought, 
for instance, by Michigan and an Illinois citizen against a 
Michigan citizen, even though it would constitute a 
controversy between citizens of different states, and would 
be a controversy to which a state was a party. Thus, this 
attempt at justifying United States v. Texas also falls short. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over cases 
between the United States and a state can be understood by 
recognizing the process by which the Constitution was 
composed and the assumptions of those who wrote and read 
it. The document uses abbreviation and consolidation to 
convey as much information as possible in a small space. The 
grant of federal jurisdiction over “all controversies to which 
the United States shall be a party” was understood to include 
within it a grant of jurisdiction over controversies between a 
state and the United States. This implicit independent grant 
was then cross-referenced by the next Clause, which gave the 
Supreme Court original jurisdiction over “those 
[controversies] in which a State shall be a Party.” Thus, the 
 
controversies to which the United States shall be a party, but the convention 
promptly removed this provision. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 171. PAUL M. BATOR, ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 297 (3d ed. 1988). 
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diversity reading of the Supreme Court’s state-party original 
jurisdiction, this Article has argued, is correct, United States 
v. Texas is correct, and Texas v. ICC is also correct. 
